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ABSTRACT
Latin American region has transitioned to democracy in the last forty-thirty years and
along with many policy reforms, citizen security has not been left behind. As these changes
evolve, the relationship between internal security and the development of a stable democracy has
acquired a great importance in terms of the factors that contribute to a free world.
The purpose of this research is to look at how security policy and policing in Argentina,
Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico have contributed to the democratization process in regards to
how the recent reforms in law enforcement in the region have created favorable conditions
towards democracy. First, this paper focuses on establishing the relationship between internal
security and democratization, moving forward to the role of law enforcement in the
demilitarization trend in the region and the world on the transition to democracy. After briefly
covering some socio economic indicators of Latin America, this inquiry applies an original
demilitarization scale of law enforcement to the citizen security institutions in the countries
mentioned above. This is the first empirical measurement of law enforcement demilitarization
for countries in Latin America. The empirical design tests whether demilitarization of internal
security affects individuals’ diffusive democracy support and police institutions’ specific
democratization or, on the contrary, there is no effect what so ever. The findings show support
for the main hypothesis that individuals from countries with more demilitarized police support in
greater scale democratic regimes; individuals from countries perceived as less corrupted were
shown to trust police institutions greater than those from countries more corrupted; finally,
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individuals that have had any crime interaction, whether themselves or through a relative,
showed less trust rates in police institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Latin American region has transitioned to democracy in the last forty to thirty years and
along with many policy reforms, citizen security has not been left behind. As well as the
structural differences in internal security institutions, we can also find variation in the levels of
democracy in the region. This thesis looks to answer questions such as how does performance
and development of citizen security reforms in Latin America contribute to the democratization
process in the region? Do the new reforms in Latin America and the transition to demilitarization
of law enforcement in the region really contribute to citizens’ positive sentiment towards
democratization of their country? Does demilitarization of citizen security lead to higher
democracy levels in Latin America?
This issue is quiet relevant for leaders in Latin American countries considering the
transition to democracy that the region has been through for the last forty years. The main
argument of this thesis is that demilitarization contributes to a greater individual approval of
democratic values. Hence, the objective is to determine whether demilitarization contributes to
democratization of public institutions or not. The argument established in this inquiry is that
political institutions are positively affected by law enforcement demilitarization in a smaller
scale than individuals’ sentiments towards democratization.
The role that the police play in the democratization process is fundamental as new
regimes need at least minimal levels of security and order, all these within the context of
protecting human rights (Marenin 1996; Cruz 2011). Security and justice institutions are
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fundamental in the development of democratic governance (Karstedt and LaFree 2006). As Latin
American countries belong to what the literature calls third-wave democracies (Huntington,
1991), the lack of stable and modern institutions is evident. Moreover, the social context of the
region has made the World Bank label Latin America as the region with the highest levels of
income inequality in the world (Hinton, 2006), creating a positive environment for criminal
activities and high levels of insecurity. Income inequality provokes individuals’ discontent
motivating or unconstraining them to participate in violent acts (Patterson, 1991) since crime
could work as a balance tool to those who lack of means to accomplish success (Merton, 1938).
This research looks to understand how security policy and policing in Argentina, Chile,
El Salvador, and Mexico have contributed to the democratization process in regards to how the
recent reforms in law enforcement in the region have created favorable conditions towards
democracy. This paper focuses first on establishing the relationship between internal security and
democratization to move forward to the role of law enforcement in the demilitarization trend in
the region and the world on the transition to democracy. This is the first empirical measurement
of law enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America. After briefly covering some
socio economic indicators of Latin America, this inquiry applies a militarization of law
enforcement scale to the citizen security institutions in the countries mentioned above. The
empirical design tests whether demilitarization of internal security affects individuals’ diffusive
democracy support and police institutions’ specific democratization or, on the contrary, there is
no effect what so ever. The findings show support for the main hypothesis that individuals from
countries with more demilitarized police support in greater scale democratic regimes; individuals
from countries perceived as less corrupted were shown to trust police institutions greater than
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those from countries more corrupted; finally, individuals that have had any crime interaction,
whether themselves or through a relative, showed less trust rates in police institutions.
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BACKGROUND
The issue and why it matters
Analyzing the relationship of citizen security and democratization has great importance
for many reasons. First, the region has been in constant reformulation of policing institutions
since its return to democracy. Second, and as mentioned, the high levels of inequality have
placed Latin America among the most violent regions of the world raising the crime rates in the
region higher than other great areas of the world, due to issues linked to drug trafficking, human
trafficking, kidnapping, etc. Lastly, the great connection between democracy and citizen security,
the rule of law guarantees the observation of human rights, and due process, as an integral part of
the emergence and institutionalization of democracy (Karstedt and LaFree, 2006).
Due to the long military authoritarian regimes that have governed great part of the region
of this research’s interest, many of the countries inherited militarized police institutions. Among
the population, there is a common sentiment of approval for the military to take control of
internal security when exceptional chaos states take place in Latin American countries. Hence, as
Neild (2003) describes, public confidence in the police and judicial system is constantly
weakened by the failure to deepen democracy, of the rule of law, and to extend citizenship rights
across all social sectors, which undermines support for democracy.
Many countries in Latin America have implemented Iron-fist policies, where increasing
penalties and construction of prisons have been the most popular actions. However, these actions
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have not being as efficient in fighting crime as they were expected to. Part of the literature has
determined that saturation policing offers a psychological displacement effect of reassurance to
the population, because of the “10-for-1 rule”, which means that it actually takes ten officers to
increase the visible presence of the police in a given area (Hinton, 2006). Therefore, the
outcomes of iron-fist policies have evidenced the need of a closer relationship between the police
and the community (Arias, Rosada-Granados & Saín, 2012).
Citizen Security and Democratization Relationship
The relationship between internal security and democracy carries great importance when
analyzing factors that would improve the levels of democratization in a region relatively and
recently free. As Karstedt and LaFree (2006) explain, public perception of democracy is highly
affected by the behavior of the police and other criminal justice agents; these actors are seen as
the key for the development of strong democracies.
Neild (2003) describes that the instrumentalist theory of policing assumes that police
reflect regimes, and their behavior will come to reflect the new values of democracy once the
legal framework has been reformed to incorporate those values. The police, as agents of internal
security, possess coercive capabilities to enforce rule of law. However these capabilities
highlight the divisive force of the structural tensions in the society. Regardless of the
differentiation, to the public perception, police is the state on the streets in regards to law and
order (Hinton, 2006). Furthermore, police performance will directly affect the perception of the
legal system and ultimately the legitimacy of the state itself. If people have a reasonable degree
of trust in the state’s institutions, they are more likely to believe that compliance, cooperation,
and loyalty will best serve their long-term personal interest. The presence of police force on the
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streets provides the public reassurance of state protection against crime and a sense of safety
(Hinton, 2006). Hence, with police misconduct, public respect for legality and the legitimacy of
the state are diminished.
The roles of the police in democracy have been long established by the literature. As it
has been argued so far, police performance will directly affect the public perception of state
legitimacy, from the symbolic point of view. Therefore, the functions of the police in democracy
are assistance and reassurance, deterrence capacity, and investigative capacity (Hinton, 2006).
Assistance and reassurance provide citizens the affirmation that a state of law and a climate of
justice exist when they can perceive a constant police presence with capacity to intervene in
insecure states. Deterrence capacity is directly affected by how the criminal element perceives
the likelihood and severity of punishment for violations of the law. Finally, investigative
capacity place the police institution as an effective and efficient auxiliary to the judiciary system
by making arrests and carrying out criminal investigations within legal boundaries (Hinton,
2006).
As features required of the police institutions, accountability and transparency have great
importance. It is in that spirit that all citizens should be governed by the same set of institutions
and legal rules; the police should be ruled in advance to performing their service in the streets.
This would provide a balance between powers of coercion and the legality of their procedures,
preventing any potential abuse against citizens.
The democratization process that took place in Latin America is part of what the
literature has called Third-wave. As the conditions of the context of the democracy that took
place in the region were completely different from the first ages of democratization, Latin
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America has developed what Rose and Shin (1999) call incomplete democracies. As third-wave
democracies have not been able to reach the complete democracies status yet, and there is no
evidence that they will be able to do so either, the critics to these countries focus on daily
violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government. O’Donnel (2004) states
that transitioning to democracy entails the construction of institutions intended to ensure
transparent electoral processes and the construction of institutions intended to promote the rule
of law and citizens’ basic rights. In addition, as Rose and Shin (1999) have stated, third-wave
democracies miss basic institutions of the modern states in order to completely develop to full
democracies; third-wave democracies have started democratization backwards, introducing free
elections before establishing such basic institutions as the rule of law and civil society. The
implementation of inadequate internal security policies in Latin America is a perfect example of
how backwards democratization took place in the region. Great part of the countries focused on
transitioning to a democratic government without setting the rules and institutions needed to
protect the new status quo, setting and reforming the new institution as things started to go,
managing at the same time the public critiques reflected in the new free elections. According to
Cruz (2011), the transitions can be framed around three types of events: authoritarian breakdown
through military coups and popular uprisings; the electoral process following the breakdowns;
and institutional reform aimed to transform the security apparatus. Latin America presents cases
on each type of those transitions.
Citizen Security and Dimensions of Democratic Support
While determining the implications of citizen security on individuals’ democratic
support, it is important to determine what dimension of regime support is the object of this
inquiry. As Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis (2014) describe the two dimensions of regime support
7

as diffuse support and specific support. The first one, as the authors explain, is related to
elemental features of the political system, therefore it last long in time since it originates from
deep-embedded political values and attachments; while specific support is directed to
performance and outputs of authorities, thus this support is constrained to perceptions and
evaluations of performance and policy outputs causing swings as citizens perceptions varies.
As the testable argument of this research is whether demilitarization of police increases
individuals’ approval for democracy, it is important to understanding the concept of diffuse
support for democracy. Belchior, Teixeira & Tsatsanis (2014) describe how diffuse support is
strongly related to regime capacity as understood by Lipset, which defines it as “the capacity of a
political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the
most appropriate and proper ones for the society” (Lipset, 1983, as cited by Belchior, Teixeira &
Tsatsanis, 2014).
Part of the literature has stated that domestic political or economic performance seems to
have little influence in regards to democracy legitimacy since support for such regime seems to
be widespread in international community (Easton, 1975). However, Magalhães (2014) suggests
instead that performance and outputs could greatly affect preferences about regime types for
individuals. According to Magalhães (2014) government effectiveness is an important factor that
determines individuals’ diffusive democracy support. He defines effectiveness of government as
“the quality of policy formulation and implementation”. As Easton (1967) and Lipset (1981)
established that specific and diffuse support are naturally tied. Carlin, Love and Zechmeister
(2013) describe that “reservoirs of good will” for diffuse support are built as result of institutions
and political actors’ sustained high performance, which generates specific support. These

8

reservoirs, according to Carlin, Love and Zechmeister (2013), are utilized by the political system
when specific support drops temporarily.
Since law enforcement is strongly associated as the state in the streets and individuals
base their democracy approval on their perception of government performance, using law
enforcement reforms in Latin America should show a strong correlation with diffuse democracy
support. As Magalhães (2014) states, contentment with the way democracy develops has been
related with numerous significant characteristics of political performance, including the actual or
alleged quality of government institutions.
Specific support has great importance for this inquiry as well. Individuals’ levels of
corruption experience from police members and/or levels of victimization could affect specific
support of the police institution. Individuals’ dissatisfaction with police performance is directly
related to their perception of the institution which could cause lower rates of specific support in
regards of the institution.
Rates of victimization fluctuate according to peoples’ experience and people’s
information related to victimization around them. Some countries in Latin America score higher
level of victimization experience rather than higher level of victimization perception. This
indirect relationship is also seen in regards of corruption. For instance, Chile has the second
highest score in the region according to Corruption Index in 2016, while the level of corruption
experience according to LAPOP is one of the lowest of the region.
Militarized police as factor of Citizen Security
Keeping in mind that the object of this analysis is Latin America in the context of
citizen security, this analysis must spend some effort understanding the military factor in internal
9

security. Latin American history, in general, has many gloomy days of military authoritarian
governance. Although almost all the region is now categorized as free or partially free according
to the Freedom House, a great part of the police institutions of Latin-American countries carry
quiet amount of military foundation. Militarization of police institutions is not a problem itself,
as Neild (2003) explains militarization can provide a sense of discipline to the institution and a
hierarchical structure that organizes its administration with clear bureaucratic steps. The issue is
when police, private security or paramilitaries commit abuses and they undermine democracy,
creating greater violence and jeopardize human rights (Neild, 2003). Furthermore, the long
history of military dictatorships in Latin America has dyed the memory of citizenship with
memories of a number of disappearances and human rights abuses. As Hinton (2006) explains, in
democracy it is expected that the police will use force more sparingly than in a dictatorship,
where accountability is a rare commodity and impunity tends to be the rule.
For the purposes of this research is important to understand the differentiation that the
literature has settled between militarism and militarization. As Kraska

(2007) discuses

militarism is the ideology focused on the best means to solve problems based on the use of force
and threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems; while
militarization, is the implementation of the ideology through the process of arming, organizing,
planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict.
Kraska (2007) provides dimensions of a military model that offer us tangible indicators
of police militarization, such as material, cultural, organizational, and operational. The material
dimension refers to martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology; cultural dimension
relates to martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and values; organizational dimension
refers to martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers, or elite squads of officers
10

patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas; and operational dimension
are the patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence,
supervision, handling high-risk situations, or warmaking/restoration. Later on, these dimensions
will have great importance in order to test this paper hypothesis.
Citizen Security in Latin America
Moving forward to the theory of this research’s hypotheses, it is important to establish
the link between law enforcement militarization and citizen security in the region. The current
landscape of citizen security in Latin America is deeply connected with the governance and
institutional structure of government prior to the democratization process. While some countries
moved forward to democratization sooner than later, all Latin American countries at some point
were military dictatorships. In the 1960s the region started to walk its way to the democratization
process that we can see now. In regards of citizen security, Neild (2003) describes that
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and from war to peace have removed the region’s
militaries from most government and internal security duties. Before the transitions, the police
violated human rights with impunity. Then the violations were targeted to political issues, and
now the violations are aimed at criminal issues.
Neild (2003) compares the Latin America authoritarian approach to the one implemented
during the South African apartheid. He finds that these two approaches shared some common
principles in regards of policing:
“the mission of the police is to support the political regime or a particular
government; police do not require public legitimacy to be effective; police have
few, if any, accountability mechanism; criminal detection capabilities are weak
and concentrated in limited areas/constituencies (whites, wealthy neighborhoods
or business elite); intelligence-gathering structures are focused on enemies of the
regime rather then gathering criminal intelligence; concentration on policing for
11

political control means that the understanding and practice of crime prevention
are poorly developed (with little tradition of visible or community policing on
which to build)”. (South African White Paper 1998, as cited by Neild, 2003).
After the dictatorship period, countries in the region kept many of the office personnel in
their police institutions, transferring the old methods to the new institutions and the new
personnel. As Cruz (2011) states, in Central America and in many countries of Latin America,
the pacts made during the transition and immediately thereafter are conditioned by agents who
held power. Some of these agents survived the transitions to constitute legal players in the new
institutional arena, while others did not. With the transitions to democracy, all social sectors
became affected with the criminal out of control situation which increased the public pressure for
internal security reforms through the region. Dissatisfaction with police performance creates
feelings of insecurity in public opinion promoting the support for militarization of police
institutions. Hinton (2006) states how throughout Latin America, countries still resort to calling
on military troops whenever the public security situation deteriorates, and occasionally, they do
so to also repress restless police.
As Arias, Rosada-Granados & Saín (2012) inform, given the political impact of levels of
perceived insecurity, since the 1980s many governments have attempted to carry out institutional
reform processes of the police which objectives and scope have varied, but in most cases have
been insufficient to address the real and the perceived security issues. In addition to the poor
perception of the police performance by the public, many citizens fear that police cannot protect
them against revenge attacks if they cooperate with criminal investigations (Neild, 2003), which
decreases the citizenship participation in internal security. Moreover, since in most cases the
police continue to enjoy impunity, the police continue to use repressive security practices, which
increase the lack of trust in the institution by the citizens.
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According to Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012), there are three cases in Latin
America that the military may--legitimately—participate in internal security: (1) as a last resort
in critical and exceptional cases; (2) through the promotion of its incorporation to the fight of the
criminality in full and permanent form; (3) and, when there is a differentiation between police
functions and the armed forces, constitutional rules on states of emergency are made flexible to
allow them to participate in the fight against crime, beyond its limits, as determined by political
authority. In the case that these extensions of competencies are granted by the constitution, the
extraordinary competences must be clearly delimited and must be temporary, with precise tasks,
deadlines, and territory.
Some common and different features of the Latin American police identified by Arias,
Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012) are shown in figure 1:

Distinct
Features

Common Features
In most countries, sometimes the
functions overlap and there is not a
clear differentiation between the police
forces and the military.

Structure, federal countries
have several police bodies
among which there is no
coordination. Centralized
countries or unitary states have
a single police force. All these
bodies are very centralized,
hierarchical and militarized.

Lack of public confidence in police
institutions, people only go to them in
extreme cases and as a last resort.

Functioning, in some countries
the investigation of crimes is the
task of judicial police, and
preventive work is undertaken
by a different police; In others
research and prevention are in
charge of a single body.

Shortcomings in the selection and training
of their personnel.

The police usually do not have
mechanisms for collecting and analyzing
information or with management and
evaluation tools, indispensable for
efficient decision-making.
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The reforms that Latin American countries have attempted to implement after their
transitions to democracy have been influenced by different reform visions. The most common
approach that Arias, Rosada-Granados, and Saín (2012) finds is increasing the human,
operational and infrastructure resources of the institution as it is, without changes in the
organization and in the police work. Thus, it limits itself to improving or expanding the existing
police system, its organizational structure, doctrinal bases, functional orientations, equipment
and infrastructure, personnel, training and training devices and professional careers, without
regard to police modalities and their impact on the crime or the type of work performed.
There are other approaches that can be implemented, visions as changing norms,
organizational structure, and involving the community, could improve the restructuration of
police institutions, training process of the personnel, decentralization of the institution, and the
institution evaluation by public opinion (Arias, Rosada-Granado, and Saín, 2012). Those changes
combined could greatly improve the institution efficacy and efficiency, any other way would be
a naïve approach to the required reforms.
Latin America context
When analyzing the relationship of citizen security and democracy in Latin America, to
better understand the context of the interaction of these variables is important to take a look at
different factors such as level of democracy, public corruption perception, cost of violence, and
police personnel per 1,000 habitants.
Freedom House develops a freedom rating based on political rights and civil liberties.
The scale goes from 1 to 7, where 1 is most free and 7 is least free. In the following graph, we
can see the 18 traditional Latin American countries object of academic research for the years
14

2002, 2010, and 2016. Chile and Uruguay have the lowest scores of the region, while Venezuela
is the least free country. The mean score for the region during those periods of time is 2.6. In
2016, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Paraguay are considered partly free countries. The rest of countries of the region are considered
free.

Freedom House Ranking
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The following table shows the cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP for
Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay for 2010. The table shows quite a
difference between the values of the selected countries; they range from 3 percent in Chile and
Uruguay, up to over 10 percent in Honduras.
Cost of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP, selected countries, 2010
Type of cost Chile
Costa Rica
Honduras
Paraguay
As
0.71
0.34
1.50
0.72
anticipation
of crime
As
2.11
1.47
8.01
6.26
consequence
of crime
As
a 0.50
0.71
1.03
1.72
response to
15

Uruguay
0.49

1.22

1.29

crime
Cost
of 3.32
crime and
violence

2.52

10.54

8.70

3

Source: Based on the Cost of Crime and Violence, IADB-UNDP (2013)(UNDP Regional Report, 2013-14)

Another illustrative factor worth considering is the Perception Corruption Index from the
Transparency International. This index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption
worldwide. The following graph shows the 18 traditional Latin American countries object of
academic research for the years 2002, 2010, and 2016. Chile and Uruguay have the highest
scores, while Venezuela is the most corrupt perceived country in the region; the mean score is
3.5.

Corruption Perception Index
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The Organization of American States (OAS) collects data in regards to police presence in
Latina American countries. The police personnel rate per 100,000 inhabitants only considers
personnel in public agencies as of December 31, whose principal functions are prevention,
detection and investigation of crime and apprehension of alleged offenders. Support staff as
secretaries, clerks, etc. are excluded from this account.
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The following graph shows 2007 and 2010 police personnel rate. As in the last
descriptive factors provided above, the main objects of focus are the same eighteen countries.
However, OAS does not provide data for Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela for those years.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Uruguay has the highest police personnel in the
region exceeding the 500 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants at least since 2003.

400
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300
250
200
150

2007

100

2010

50
0

These indicators provide an overview of the situation of the countries study in this
research in comparison with the rest of the region. Chile is the out layer among the countries
chose for this analysis in regards of Freedom House index and Corruption Perception index. The
geographic location of El Salvador and Mexico explains some of the similar social and internal
issues, as drug cartels, human trafficking and proliferation of gangs.
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HYPOTHESES
The argument to be examined here is that demilitarization of law enforcement increases
diffuse democratic support. Considering that transition and the history of democracies in Latin
America are strongly related with the role of military forces in governmental administration, it is
expected that countries that have clearly separated internal and external security functions in two
different institutions have higher diffusive democracy support. Therefore, countries with less
militarized law enforcement should show higher levels of diffuse democratization approval by
individuals.
(H1) Countries with less militarized law enforcement show higher levels of diffuse
democratization approval by individuals.
On the other hand, specific support towards police will be greatly affected by individuals’
victimization perception. Whether individuals have been victims of crime and how the police
procedures after the event developed could have a great effect on individuals’ efficiency
perception on the institution. If individuals feel unsafe on the daily basis, added to the lack of
protection mechanisms their satisfaction with law enforcement and the rule of law in the country
may have negative consequences for police specific support. Therefore, individuals that
expressed higher level of victimization show lower levels of specific democratization approval.
(H2) Higher levels of victimization should lead to lower specific support of police
institutions.
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Lastly, individuals that have interacted with police officers and that have experienced
bribery requests for officer to performance their job or—to the contrary—to get away with legal
fines may express lower level of specific support for citizen security institutions. If individuals
perceive law enforcement as a corrupt institution their trust in the institution may be affected
negatively, and the belief that they may need to be ready to protect themselves may diminish
their specific support for the institution. Therefore, individuals from lower corruption perception
rates countries show higher levels of specific democratization approval.
(H3) Higher levels of corruption perception in the country should lead to lower specific
support for police institutions.
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METHODOLOGY
Militarization coding
Despite demilitarization of police enforcement is a common vision in Latin America, for
the inquiry purposes, the countries object of analysis are Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and
Mexico. As Kraska (1999) explains, the analysis of demilitarization of law enforcement police
should center its effort on what level does civilian police fall on a continuum—culturally,
organizationally, operationally, and materially—and in what direction they are currently headed.
Based on Kraska (2007) dimensions military model, material, cultural, organizational,
and operational the demilitarization scale will be applied to code demilitarization. The material
dimension refers to the extent of martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology;
cultural dimension relates to the extent of martial language, style (appearance), beliefs, and
values; organizational dimension refers to the extent of martial arrangements such as ‘command
and control’ centers, or elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations
patrolling high-crime areas; and operational dimension are the extent of operational patterns of
activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling
high-risk situations, or warmaking/restoration. To test the above hypotheses and based on Kaskra
(2007) militarization coding, a scale 1-4 will be applied to Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and
Mexico police institution as follows:
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Material:


1 to 4 from very low weaponry military materials, as 9mm, to 4 heavy military
materials, as rifles and grenades; 2 would be define on whether agents are authorized
to use fire weapons during protests or marches. This category also accounts for the
extent of military control vehicles capacity such as control vehicles with water or CS
cannon, or in the contrary the usage of horses for riot control.

Cultural:


1 to 4 from casual attire to military-styled uniforms to police man wearing bullet proof
vests and helmets on regular basis. This category also accounts for the extent of military
beliefs and values in the institution’s mission. The description of the institution, mission
and vision provide a great weight to the coding for the countries, therefore institutions
that define itself as a civil organization will rank below 2, whether institutions that
describe itself as a military institution will rank above 2.

Organizational:


1 to 4 from completely civilian organization to normalized use of elite squads of officers
patterned after military special operations team. This category accounts for whether
police belongs to the Ministry or Department of Defense or to another institution; it also
accounts if agents in service that abuse human rights or commit a crime are judge by
military justice courts or by civil courts, the first will rank above 2 in the scale.

Operational:


1 to 4 from civilian oriented operations to highly operational patterns modeled after the
military for intelligence gathering, supervision, handling high-risk situations, and highly
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aggressive and punitive operations such as some zero-tolerance initiatives. Such
institutions that conduct highly intelligence operations will rank closer to 4.

Country militarization analysis
Argentina
The Constitutional Act of the Federal Police enacted on 1958, establishes that the
Federal Police performs functions of Security and Judicial Police—provides services to the
judiciary and public ministry, for investigation of crimes and execution of sentences—in the
territory of the Provinces and Capital of the Nation, within the jurisdiction of the Government of
the Nation. The Federal Police depends on the National Executive Branch, through the Ministry
of Security. This act also establishes the hierarchical scale of range, modes of classification,
promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. There are two levels of
police forces: those of federal jurisdiction and those belonging to each of the twenty-three
provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires. Police officers who report crimes during
their service are tried by the Criminal Oral Courts (Smink, 2009).
The Argentinean Federal Police has the local police divisions also: Security Police
(they are those that are in the street), Police Motorized (patrols streets and avenues of the city
with motorcycles last generation and four wheelers), the DOUCAD (Division of Urban
Operations of Containment and Activities Sports), the CGI (Infantry Guard Corps), the GOM
(Motorized Operative Group) and the PM (Mounted Police), which are all units specialized in
riot control. Policy implemented since 2004 that the troops do not act with firearms in the control
of marches and claims (Ámbito, 2010).
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The current General Regulation of the Argentinean Federal Police Number 10 about
Uniforms, Uniforms and Attributes, was approved in 1996. Such bylaws establish every detail of
the uniform from the lowest to the highest range. The Rules define the uniform that law
enforcement officers must wear for parades, social events, daily basis, on duty and training. The
bylaws also specify the range distinctive.
The Constitutional Act of Federal Police established the hierarchical scale of range,
modes of classification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command. The
Federal Police has a special operations division, the Federal Operations Task Force (GEOF),
which is charged with conducting counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics missions, as well as
the rescue of hostages and protection of heads of state visiting the country.
The G.E.O.F have machine guns Minimi Saw M249, Belgian manufacture, able to load
250 caliber 5.56 bullets in a cassette charger. In addition, the troops wear SIZ assault rifles .223
caliber, with 30 ammunition loaders; and helmets with cameras and hearing protectors. The GE1 group, meanwhile, has Remington 308 caliber rifles and British-made CG rifles. Street officers
utilize 9 mm (Mendoza Post, 2017).
Argentinean Federal Police uses Focus II and Ranger units, armored and equipped with
communication and image recording technology, to patrol (Autoblog, 2013); and uses water
cannon in protests and marches (Ámbito, 2010).
According with the description above, Argentinean Federal Police score in Kaskra
(2007) militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material 2.7; Cultural 2; Organizational 2.7; and
Operational 2.7. Averaging a total score of 2.5.
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Chile
Citizen security labors are in charge of different institutions in Chile. Polícia de
Investigaciones is in charge of assisting the Judicial system to solve investigations in order to
determine presence of crime and authorship; while Seguridad Ciudadana is charge of assisting
municipal security through supporting Carabineros de Chile. Although these two institutions are
highly recognized by the community, citizens’ perception of national citizen security are
exclusively link to Carabineros de Chile, therefore this analysis only focuses on individuals
perceptions in regards of such institution.
The Constitutional Act of the Carabineros establishes that Carabineros de Chile is a
military and technical police institution, which integrates the public force and exists to give
effectiveness to the law; its purpose is to guarantee and maintain public order and internal public
security throughout the territory of the Republic and fulfill the other functions entrusted to it by
the Constitution and the law. This act also established the hierarchical scale of range, modes of
calcification, promotion protocol, tenure, command and succession of command.
Since 2011 Carabineros of Chile depends directly on the Ministry of Interior and Public
Security and is administratively linked with it through the Undersecretariat of the Interior.
Carabineros of Chile is an armed police force is essentially obedient, non-deliberative,
professional, hierarchical and disciplined and its personnel is subjected to the basic rules
established in such organic law, its Statute, Military Justice Code and internal regulations
(Ministerio Nacional de Defensa, Gobierno de Chile).
The Constitutional Act of Carabineros of Chile established the existence of Grupo de
Operaciones Policiales Especiales (Police Special Operations Group, GOPE), which is a special
force of military uniformed police that carry out high-risk police operations throughout the
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country, including bomb disposal, location and tracking of bombs and explosives, rescuing
people or bodies from places of difficult access, anti-crime raids and clashes.
The current Uniform Rules and Equipment for Appointment Staff Institutional of
Carabineros de Chile was approved by de facto president Augusto Pinochet Hiriat in February
15, 1980. Such bylaws establish every detail of the uniform from the lowest to the highest range.
The Rules define the uniform that law enforcement officers must wear for parades, social events,
daily basis, on duty and training. The bylaws also specify the range distinctive.
In the case of Chile FAMAE (Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército) is in charge of
providing weapons to Carabineros police force. FAMAE is a Chilean state-owned firearms
manufacturer, which is part of the national army. Carabineros officers carry 9mm guns when in
duty along with handcuffs and baton, and drive Dodge Charger Police Interceptor for regular
patrol (Carvallo, 2014), while for protests and marches they use Panhard-branded Renault
armored vehicles that have state-of-the-art technology and each weighs five tons as shooting tear
gas and water cannons (Martínez, 2014; RT, 2015).
As a modernization process, Carabineros has increased its technological resources in
the various units it owns. Carabineros has the most advanced digital radio system in Latin
America, called SmartZone. The institution also has the AUPOL (police automation) system,
which allows each police unit to be equipped computationally and connected nationally. Some of
the technologies that Carabineros possess are stereoscopic magnifying glass, ultraviolet light,
Alcotest (breathzalyzers), off-road motorcycles, ambulance aircraft equipped with resuscitation
and first aid instruments, Helicopter BK 117, Global Position System (GPS), mobile computers,
Autovelox (speed pistol), and surveillance cameras (Icarito).
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According with the description above, Carabineros de Chile Police score in
militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material 2.7; Cultural 2.3; Organizational 3.3; and Operational 3.
Averaging a total score of 2.8.
El Salvador
The Policia Nacional Civil (PNC) of El Salvador is an established civilian police
institution which mission is to guarantee the free exercise of the Rights and Freedoms of the
people, security, tranquility and order, preventing and repressing crime, with strict respect for
human rights, integrating personnel commitment and the participation of the population,
contributing to the Promotion of the rule of law and integral development of the country.
The Decree number 82, Regulation Of The Law Organization Of The National Civil
Police of El Salvador in its Art. 4 establishes that the organizational structure of the PNC will be
conformed by: The General Directorate, of whom The General Subdirectorate, the
Subdirectorates, the General Inspectorate, the Technical Council, the Center for Police
Intelligence, the Internal Audit Unit and the Courts. The PNC divisions are: Division of
Environment Joint, Public Security Command Division, Mounted Police Division, and Rural
Police Regional Division. Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the
Criminal Oral Courts (Cáceres, 2017).
The Special Police Operations Group was created in 2013 and is composed of more than
thirty elements of the different units: Rural Police, Finance Division, Intelligence Center, Police
Reaction Group (GRP) and Operational Tactical Unit (UTO), among others. The surveillance,
capture and follow-up of criminals are the main functions that have been delegated to the Group
of Special Police Operations (GOPES) (Ortiz, 2006). The elements have been instructed in
assault technique with long weapons and short weapons.
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Although the PNC have made efforts to modernize its equipment, its material resources
are still quite limited. During patrol activities officers use off-road vehicles, bullet-proof vests,
9mm guns, while for protests and marches police agents use tear gas and rubber bullets. Some of
the highlights of technologies that PNC posses are a modern 911 emergency system, video
cameras in public places, an automated fingerprint system and a laboratory for DNA analysis
(Diario1, 2015; Marroquín, 2008). The institutions also possess Sig Sauer pistols and chargers.
According with the description above, Policia Nacional Civil of El Salvador scored in
militarization coding 1-4 scale for 2007, 2009 and 2011: Material 1.7; Cultural 1; Organizational
1.7; and Operational 1.7. Averaging a total score of 1.5. While for the years 2013 and 2015 the
PNC of El Salvador scored: Material 2; Cultural 1; Organizational 2; and Operational 2.
Mexico
The Federal Police Law in its Article 2 establishes that the Federal Police of Mexico is
a decentralized administrative body of the Ministry of Public Security. The Police institution
apply and operate the public security policy in the area of crime prevention and combat, in
addition to investigating the commission of crimes under the leadership and command of the
Public Ministry of the Federation. According to Art. 5 the divisions of the institutions are
Intelligence, Research, Regional Security, Scientific, Anti-drugs, and Federal Forces (DOF,
2009). Police officers who report crimes during their service are tried by the Federal Criminal
Procedure District Court (Meceda, 2012).
The Special Operations Group, also known as GEO, is a special operations unit of the
Federal Police of Mexico. They perform a great variety of operations among which stand out;
The rescue of hostages, the apprehension of highly dangerous criminals, counter-narcotics
actions, counter-terrorism and the fight against organized crime. Its members have been trained
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by the Aeromóvil Group of Special Forces of the Army and the Brigade of Parachutist Fusiliers
of the Navy of Mexico, the GEO of Spain, the AFEUR of Colombia, the RAID of France and the
FAMS of the United States (Merino).
Federal Police uniforms are regulated by the Manual of Uniforms and Currencies of
The Federal Preventive Police which specifically prescribes that police agents must wear bullet
proof vests and boots, while there material equipments show the military orientation of the
institution (Manual de uniformes y divisas de la Policía Federal preventive, 2008). Although the
patrol transportation includes Chevrolet Suburban, Toyota Hilux, Nissan Tiida, Nissan Tsuru,
and Dodge Charger; for special operations against organized crime and high-impact crime the
police uses Ballistic Armored Tactical Transport; for transporting dogs that are experts in the
detection of narcotics, explosives and human remains, and that are strategic in research the
institution uses Van Express vans; and for the Directorate of Special Services for Security and
Protection of Persons agents assigned to the security of officials, judges, witnesses and victims
use Armored Suburban; In addition, trucks rinos and arms Galil and Colt (Riestra, 2015).
In regards to weapons use by the Federal Police of Mexico, the institution possess
pistols, submachine guns, assault rifles, sniper rifles, machine guns, shotguns, and grenade
launchers.
According with the description above, the Policía Federal de Mexico scores in
militarization coding 1-4 scale: Material 3.7; Cultural 3; Organizational 3.7; and Operational 3.7.
Averaging a total score of 3.5.
The following graph shows Demilitarization average scores for each country.
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Empirical Design
In order to test the hypotheses, the unit of analysis is individual-year for the years of
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015 for surveys collected in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and
Mexico by Latinobarometro. The time frame for this analysis is to consider the last ten years in
those countries where the political landscape have changed from left to right indistinctly.
Argentina switched to a right wing president after decades of left wings administration during a
deep economic crisis; while Chile went back and forth from left to right and back to left wing
administration for the first time since its return to democracy. El Salvador started to face the
largest migration crisis in the country due to public security issues in its history; while Mexico
flipped back the administration coin after twelve years of PAN administration with a high rate of
public insecurity and organized crime. The importance of my unit of analysis is that accounts for
the variation of diverse countries of Latin America.
Testing the hypotheses required three different multivariate OLS regression models with
the following variables:
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Dependent Variable
Hypothesis 1 tests whether or not the level of diffuse democracy support varies across
individual-year when accounting for demilitarization level. To test this hypothesis, a created
combined variable, Democracy Support, accounts from Latinobarometro questions: (A) With
which of the following statements do you agree most? Democracy is preferable to any other kind
of government (1); Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable
to a democratic one (-1); and, For people like me, it doesn’t matter whether we have a
democratic or non-democratic regime (0); (B) In general, would you say you are very satisfied,
quite satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the working of the democracy in
(country)? Very satisfied (4), Quite satisfied (3), Not very satisfied (2); and, Not at all satisfied
(1); and, (C) Do you strongly agree (4), agree (3), disagree (2) or strongly disagree (1) with the
following statement? Democracy may have problems but it is the best system of government.
Hypothesis 2 tests whether or not the level of specific democracy support for police
institutions varies across individual-year when accounting for victimization level; while
hypothesis 3 tests whether or not the level of specific democracy support for police institutions
varies across individual-year when accounting for corruption perception. To test these
hypotheses, a variable—Trust in Police—from Latinobarometro question is used: Please look at
this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions.
Would you say you have a lot (4), some (3), a little (2) or no trust (1)? Police.
Coding values for Latinobarometro questions were modified in order for results to have
logic understanding for dependent variables and independent variables.
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Independent Variables
The main hypothesis, H(1) uses Demilitarization as independent variable. This variable
uses militarization average scores values described previously in this inquire. For logic
understanding of the results the values have been inverted.
For H(2), a created combined variable, Victimization, accounts from Latinobarometro
questions: (A) How often are you concerned that you could be a victim of a violent crime?
Almost all the time (4), Sometimes (3), Occasionally (2), or Never (1); and, (B) Have you (1) or
a relative (2) been assaulted, attacked, or the victim of a crime in the last 12 months? The values
of the latter question were modified to dichotomous, in which if the respondent or a relative
experience a crime it was assigned value one (1), if for the contrary, the respondent nor a relative
experience a crime it was assigned value zero (0).
The independent variable for H(3) is Corruption Perception Index value. Corruption
Perception Index is a score of how corrupt countries’ public sectors are seen to be, it captures the
informed views of analysts, businesspeople and experts in countries around the world. Score
values are 1-10, 1 been most corrupt and 10 been less corrupt.
Control Variables
When testing for democracy support it is inevitable to control for democracy level, to do
such Freedom House index—Freedom House—is the most accurate score to use. The index
accounts for political rights and civil liberties. Values go from 1, being the best, to 7, being the
worst. For logic understanding of the results score values have been inversed.
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GDP per capita is controlled in order to account for the economic situation of the home
country of the respondents. Values were retrieved from the Inter American Development Bank
data base, which does not have the value for 2015 for El Salvador. To maintain the increase
value trend, an average of the difference between 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2013 was added to the
2013 value and assigned to 2015.
Considering the indigenous conflicts in Latin American countries, indigenous is a
dichotomous variable that accounts for individuals self identify as indigenous. In addition, a
socioeconomic level variable accounts for respondents’ economic status; this variable is based on
the survey interviewer assessment at the end of the interview. The last control variable is age.
Models look as it follows:
Model 1:
Diffuse Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 Demilitarization + ϒ2 CPI + ϒ3 Freedom House
+ ϒ4 GDP per capita + ϒ5 Ethnicity+ ϒ6 Age + ϒ7 Socioeconomic
Level + ᴣ
Model 2.a:
Specific Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 Victimization+ ϒ2 demilitariation + ϒ3 Freedom House
+ ϒ4 GDP per capita + ϒ5 Ethnicity + ϒ6 Age + ϒ7 Socioeconomic
Level + ᴣ
Model 2.b:
Specific Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 CPI + ϒ2 demilitarization + ϒ3 Freedom House
+ ϒ4 GDP per capita + ϒ5 Ethnicity + ϒ6 Age
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+ ϒ7 Socioeconomic Level + ᴣ
Model 2.c:
Specific Democracy Support = ϒ0 + ϒ1 demilitarization + ϒ2 Freedom House
+ ϒ3 GDP per capita + ϒ4 Ethnicity + ϒ5 Age
+ ϒ6 Socioeconomic Level + ᴣ
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RESULTS
Table 1 indicates the findings in regards of hypothesis 1. As it shows, the raw coefficient
of diffuse democracy support is 3.155 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding
demilitarization and the rest of my control variables, there is a .245 effect on democracy support
at p-value of 0.01 of statistical significance. Most control variables do not show statistically
significant results, Corruption Perception Index showed a negative correlation of -.078, while
Freedom House score showed a positive relationship of 0.243. GDP per capita is the only control
variable with statistical significant results although it stays constant. These results support
hypothesis 1, showing that individuals from more demilitarized countries support in greater
levels democratic regimes than individual from more militarized countries.
Table 1
Democracy Support
Demilitarization

0.245
(0.042)**
-0.078
(0.054)
0.243
(0.191)
0.000
(0.000)*
-0.164
(0.071)
0.002
(0.001)
0.115
(0.054)
3.155
(0.204)**
0.10
16,820

Corruption Perception Index
Freedom House
GDP per capita
Indigenous
Age
Socioeconomic Level
Constant
R2
N
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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Table 2 indicates the findings in regards to hypotheses 2 and 3. Model 2.a shows the
relationship between individuals’ trust in police and victimization; Model 2.b shows the
relationship between individuals’ trust in police and Corruption Perception Index; while Model
2.c, shows the relationship between individuals’ trust in police and demilitarization without
accounting for neither victimization nor Corruption Perception Index.
As Model 2.a shows, the raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police
institutions is 1.923 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding victimization and the rest
of the control variables, there is a -.186 effect on trust in police at p-value of 0.01 of statistical
significance. The control variable that obtained a statistical significance of 0.01 is Freedom
House index, which shows a positive relation of .525. Although the rest of the variables do not
show statistical significance, GDP per capita remains constant, while indigenous status shows a
negative relation in regards of trust in police.
Model 2.b shows a raw coefficient of specific democracy support for police institutions
of 1.3667 with statistical significance of 0.01. When adding Corruption Perception index and the
rest of the control variables, there is a 0.093 effect on trust in police with not statistical
significant p-value. Control variables did not show statistical significant results, however their
trend remains the same that in model 1.
Model 2.c shows a very similar result in regards of demilitarization effect on trust in
police that in Model 1, again without statistical significance. The raw coefficient of specific
democracy support for police institutions is 1.629 with statistical significance of 0.01. When
adding demilitarization and the rest of the control variables, there is a -.051 effect on trust in
police. The control variable that obtained a statistical significance of 0.01 is Freedom House

35

index, which shows a positive relation of .541. Although the rest of the variables do not show
statistical significance, GDP per capita remains constant, while indigenous status shows a
negative relation in regards of trust in police.
These results do not support hypothesis 2, showing that individuals that either experience
crime or fear of been victims of crime trust less police institutions than those with no
victimization relation. However, these results support hypothesis 3, showing that countries that
are perceived as less corrupted also show a positive effect on individuals trust towards police
institutions. In regards of the main independent variable of this inquire, demilitarization,
although the results are not statistically significant the results show that higher level of
demilitarization affect negatively individuals’ trust in police.
Table 2. Trust in Police
Model 2.a
Victimization

Model 2.b

Model 2.c

-0.186
(0.040)*

Corruption Perception Index

0.093
(0.031)

Demilitarization
Freedom House
GDP per capita
Indigenous
Age
Socioeconomic Level
Constant
R2
N

-0.050

-0.003

-0.051

(0.023)

(0.029)

(0.021)

0.525

0.258

0.541

(0.058)**

(0.120)

(0.050)**

-0.000

-0.000

-0.000

(0.000)*

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.030

-0.048

-0.036

(0.042)

(0.028)

(0.039)

0.003

0.003

0.003

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

0.041

0.045

0.038

(0.026)

(0.025)

(0.027)

1.923

1.367

1.629

(0.160)**

(0.172)**

(0.123)**

0.11
16,820
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
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0.11
16,820

0.10
16,820

Correlation and Principal Components/Correlation test were performed. Democracy
support variables added to create the combined variable diffuse democracy support for model 1
showed they were not highly correlated. Principal Components/Correlation test showed good
scale of reliability.
In addition to the test described above, is important to note that control for year is omitted
from the report.
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CONCLUSIONS
The citizen security reforms implemented in the Latin American region since its return to
democracy have contributed to the stability of the regime. However, security issues are all over
the region. Indigenous conflicts in Chile and Argentina keep increasing the intensity of clashes
among citizens and police personnel, getting to the point of boosting the international community
concern in regards the conflict. In addition, organized crime and drug cartels in Central America
do not give law enforcement a break jeopardizing internal security to extremes where civilians
are forced to request asylum in other countries in order to live in peace.
The relationship between democratization and citizen security has long been established
by the literature. As Neild (2003) and (Hinton, 2006) describe, law enforcement directly affect
people’s perceptions of the regime and the State perception. As individuals interact with police
agents on a regular basis, their communication and satisfaction with police institutions will have
a natural effect in people’s support for the regime. As this inquiry looked to answer questions
such as how does performance and development of citizen security reforms in Latin America
contribute to the democratization process in the region? Do the new reforms in the Latin
America and the transition to demilitarization of law enforcement in the region really contribute
to citizens’ positive sentiment towards democratization of their country? Does demilitarization of
citizen security lead to higher democracy levels in Latin America? The development of the
empirical showed great insights to be considered.
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The main argument examined here is that demilitarization of law enforcement increases
diffuse democratic support. As mentioned before, the role of military forces in governmental
administration in Latin America are strongly related with transition and history of democracies in
the region, therefore countries that have divided internal and external security functions in two
different institutions have higher diffusive democracy support from individuals. The empirical
results showed that individuals from more demilitarized countries support in greater levels
democratic regimes than individual from more militarized countries.
In regards to specific support towards police, the results found that is affected by
individuals’ victimization perception in the opposite direction that the hypothesis anticipated.
The fear/ worry of becoming crime victim or the experience of having been a victim has a great
effect on individuals’ trust on the institution in a negative way. Individuals that feel unsafe on a
daily basis and perceive lack of protection mechanisms see their satisfaction with law
enforcement and the rule of law agents in the country affected negatively for police specific
support. The results from the model shows that individuals that either experience crime or fear of
being victims of crime trust less police institutions than those with no victimization relation.
These results imply that further analysis need to be done; however, interaction with police in
drug trafficking areas where corruption could take place in higher scales could decrease effective
performance of police, decreasing at the same time trust in the institution.
Finally, police interaction and media coverage affect corruption perception of individuals
in regards of public institutions. As the third hypothesis speculated, better rates of corruption
perception would affect positively specific support for democratization of police institutions, the
empirical results supported the theory. Individuals from countries with lower rates of corruption
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perception showed higher trust rates on police institutions, showing higher specific support rates
for law enforcement institutions.
In addition, is important to highlight that demilitarization rates showed negative effect on
individuals’ trust on police. Although those results are not statistically significant, the possibility
of individuals trusting police enforcement greatly when the institutions are more militarized
suggest that further analysis is needed to understand the relationship between demilitarization
and specific support for law enforcement institutions. Understanding this relationship would
provide fundamental information to law making agents that seek to endure diffusive support for
democracy.
This research provides great insights to understand how democratization is affected by
police role in internal security. As Marenin (1996), Cruz (2011), and (Karstedt and LaFree 2006)
established, new regimes need at least minimal levels of security and order, all these within the
context of protecting human rights; due to security and justice institutions are fundamental in the
development of democratic governance. As this is the first empirical measurement of law
enforcement demilitarization for countries in Latin America, the new spectrum of analysis
invites researches interested in the region to expand the analysis to other countries and see if the
results are a generalizable trend throughout the total region.
Modernization of technologies in police institutions is necessary to address internal
security issues; as GDP increases throughout the region the resources implemented in police
institutions rise as well. Rather than limiting the material resources of law enforcement, the
institutions and governors must pay great attention to cultural and operational factors that rule
police performance in order to promote a positive trend to democratization stability. Otherwise
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international institutions such as International Amnesty, Freedom House and Transparency
International will continue to express their concern in regards of human rights protection and
regime violations.
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